


# Scoop: Mitigation of Recapture Attacks on Provenance-Based Media Authentication


Yuxin (Myles) Liu, Habiba Farrukh, Ardalan Amiri Sani, Gene Tsudik




Sharad Agarwal



## Provenance-based media authentication



## Recapture attack in the provenance era




## Recapture attack is not new, but it is getting more powerful and dangerous

- Advances in content manipulation/fabrication and display technologies


- Two types of recapture attacks: screen-based and print-based
- Existing countermeasures are based on prior knowledge of the recapture medium and/or the camera
- Attackers are in control** here (recapture medium and camera)

- A user study with 16 photos (8 recaptured and 8 original)
- 43 adult participants
- Average correct classification rate:  $50.15\% (t(42) = 0.071, p = 0.944)$




## Depth-enabled provenance

- Time-of-Flight depth sensors (dToF and iToF)
- Measure distance to a target
- Equipped on modern smartphones (e.g., iPhone)




## Not all flat surfaces are recaptures; not all recaptures are misleading



- According to point clouds (reconstructed with provenance depth), they're both flat


- These two photos contain recapture, but they're not misleading

### Categorization of recapture




- Finding misleading recapture can assist people in identifying malicious recapture
- Need to compare human perception of depth with provenance depth
- Use learning-based monocular depth estimation to estimate human's perception of depth


## Scoop's workflow



## Scoop in action




## Prototype




## Dataset and evaluation

### A first-of-its-kind dataset

- Captured using our two smartphone camera prototypes
- Includes 122 unique data points with 78 recapture scenarios (TVs, cardboard cutouts, projector, and mixed)
- Both photos and videos
- A cornerstone for evaluating systems like Scoop



### Effectiveness



### Runtime overhead (s)

### Storage overhead (%)

